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ii. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann, §78-2A-3(2)(j), and Article VIII Section 4 
of the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does Utah law provide insurance coverage to 
an employee who is acting beyond the scope of his employment, 
under an insurance policy which is issued to and names his 
employer as the "named insured"? 
2. Does Utah law allow a finding that an 
employee had permission to go and party with a company vehicle 
when the employee admits that he was given and understood 
specific and express instructions not to use the company 
vehicle for personal errands? 
3. Is there insurance coverage under the implied 
permission theory when the user grossly deviates from his prior 
open and notorious use of the vehicle? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation would 
determine the issues at hand. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Insurance Company ("USF&G"), filed this action seeking a 
declaratory judgment as to potential coverage under a policy it 
had issued to the J.R. Broadbent Company. USF&G named as 
defendants J.R. Broadbent Company employee Benny 01sen, and 
two injured non-employees, Kathy Brooks and Melissa Albee. 
Kathy Brooks and Melissa Albee were injured while 
riding in a Broadbent company vehicle that was being operated 
by Broadbent employee Benny Olsen. Mr. Olsen did not 
file an Answer. Ms. Brooks and Ms. Albee both filed answers 
and contested the allegation that there was no coverage. In 
addition, Ms. Brooks filed a Third-Party Complaint against J.R. 
Broadbent, dba J.R. Broadbent Livestock. The Third-Party 
Complaint was dismissed on March 3, 1989. 
On April 6, 1989, a bench trial was held. All 
testimony was presented through depositions. At the conclusion 
of the testimony Judge Brian immediately ruled from the Bench. 
Judge Brian entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. He found coverage for two reasons. An Order and a 
Judgment were signed on April 24, 1989. 
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Appellant USF&G filed its Notice of Appeal on May 
24, 1989. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The J.R. Broadbent Livestock Company owns various 
ranch property in the Manila, Utah area. Its South Valley 
Ranch is run by Paul Franklin. Paul Franklin lives in a 
trailer on the ranch. Mr. Franklin hired his grandson Benny 
Olsen to work as a ranch employee. Mr. Olsen lived in a 
separate trailer near Mr. Franklin's. (Franklin deposition 
pp. 5, and 11.) 
Each of the Broadbent employees was assigned a pickup 
truck for use while working on the South Valley Ranch. The 
South Valley Ranch does not have any written guidelines 
pertaining to the use of the company trucks. Broadbent 
employees were allowed to use the vehicles to travel to and 
from work. In addition, the Broadbent employees were allowed 
to use the company trucks to run errands in Manila or to travel 
to Wyoming to buy supplies. Paul Franklin, the ranch manager, 
told all the employees not to use the company-owned trucks for 
socializing after hours. He remembered specifically telling 
this to his grandson Benny Olsen. Benny Olsen 
confirmed that he had been told and understood this 
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information. (Franklin deposition pp. 7, 8 14, Olsen 
deposition pp. 6, 9.) 
At one time Benny Olsen owned his own vehicle. 
He sold it approximately a month or two prior to May 31, 1986. 
Mr. Olsen then stored his personal gear, including a 
motorcycle and fishing rod, in his assigned pickup. He 
admitted that he started to "slide it off" and use the vehicle 
for personal errands. Paul Franklin once got "pissed off" 
and told Benny Olsen that he should not use the vehicle for 
personal errands. (Olsen deposition pp. 6, 9. Shoup 
deposition p. 29.) 
Mr. Franklin has cancer, therefore he is not always 
actively involved in operating the ranch. Robert McKee 
helped Mr. Franklin run the ranch. His stepson Jim Shoup 
also worked as an employee. Jim Shoup stated that his 
step-father was concerned about the amount of gas that Benny 
Olsen was using in his company-owned pickup. (Shoup 
deposition pp. 61, 68, 71.) 
Benny Olsen was working on May 31, 1986. He used 
the pickup while irrigating approximately 13 miles west of 
Manila. Benny Olsen returned to the ranch after completing 
his chores. He took the Broadbent pickup to meet Jim Shoup. 
Benny Olsen and Jim Shoup drove in Benny's company-owned pickup 
to Manila and bought some beer. They then drove in the same 
vehicle to Dutch John, Utah. They bought more beer in Dutch 
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John, Utah, and eventually met respondents, Kathy Brooks and 
Melissa Albee. When the accident happened Benny Olsen 
and the two girls were riding in the pickup. Jim Shoup and a 
third girl were following in her car. They were traveling to 
Wyoming to buy more beer when the accident occurred. Benny 
Olsen was fired the next day. (Olsen deposition pp. 10, 
11, 12, 13, 15, and 16.) 
The J.R. Broadbent Ranch had obtained an insurance 
policy from the USF&G Insurance Company. The insurance 
policy was a standard commercial automobile insurance policy. 
The policy contained several provisions pertaining to who was 
an insured. The policy contained the following definitions: 
a. "You" and "your" mean the person or 
organization shown as the named 
insured in Item 1 of the 
Declarations. (Item 1 listed J.R. 
Broadbent, dba J.R. Broadbent Ranch.) 
The policy provided under Section IV(d) who is insured as 
follows: 
1. You are an insured for any covered 
auto. 
2. Anyone else is an insured while using 
with your permission a covered auto 
you own, hire or borrow except: 
(a) Someone using a covered auto you 
hire or borrow from one of your 
employees or a member of his or her 
household. 
(b) Someone using a covered auto 
while he or she is working in the 
5-
business of selling, servicing, 
repairing or parking autos. 
The Trial Court entered various findings of fact. 
(See Attachment.) The Court then concluded as a matter of law 
that since Mr. Olsen was an employee driving a Broadbent 
vehicle, that he was a named insured under the policy. In 
addition the Court concluded as a matter of law that 
Mr. Olsen's open and "notorious" use of the vehicle 
established implied permission for any use by him of the 
vehicle, and therefore that he was entitled to insurance 
coverage under the Broadbent policy. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The USF&G insurance policy lists J.R. Broadbent an 
individual and the J.R. Broadbent Ranch as insureds. Mr. J.R. 
Broadbent is entitled to insurance. The Ranch is entitled to 
coverage for liability it faces for automobile accidents. It 
can only face liability for an employee's accident if that 
employee is within the scope and course of his employment. 
Benny Olsen was not within the scope and course of his 
employment at the time the accident occurred. Therefore, he is 
not a named insured under the policy. 
Utah has adopted the strict construction theory in 
regards to permissive users of automobiles. The strict 
construction theory is that if one deviates from his "permitted 
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use" of a vehicle there is no insurance coverage. Mr. Olsen 
was given permission to use the vehicle to perform his work 
functions. He could have obtained permission to use the 
vehicle to travel to Manila or Wyoming to buy personal 
supplies. Mr. Olsen violated this permitted use by taking 
the vehicle after hours for his own personal entertainment. 
Therefore this is no coverage. 
The trial court judge found that Mr. Olsen had 
implied permission to use the vehicle, and under the liberal 
construction theory that this permission went to any and all 
uses. The majority view adopts a third position of minor or 
gross deviations. This theory looks at the time, place, and 
purpose of the deviation from the permitted use. Benny 
Olsen's deviation is not related in time, place, or purpose 
to the implied permission that was given to him. Therefore, as 
there was a gross deviation from the permitted use Benny 
Olsen did not have permission to use the vehicle and thus 
there was no insurance coverage. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EMPLOYEES ARE COVERED UNDER COMMERCIAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES AS NAMED INSUREDS ONLY WHEN 
ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE AND COURSE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT. 
A determinative issue in this appeal is whether or 
not there is insurance coverage for an employee who is using a 
company vehicle after hours and beyond the scope of his 
employment. If so, the other issues are moot. 
The USF&G Insurance Company issued a standard 
commercial automobile policy to J.R. Broadbent, dba 
J.R. Broadbent Ranch. The policy listed no other named 
insureds. It listed all the J.R. Broadbent vehicles as covered 
autos. 
On May 31, 1986, Broadbent employee Benny Olsen 
was involved in an accident near Dutch John, Utah. Dutch John 
is located approximately 25 miles from Manila where Benny 
Olsen worked and lived. After finishing work Benny Olsen 
and fellow employee Jim Shoup bought some beer and drove in 
Mr. Olsen's assigned Broadbent pickup to Manila. They bought 
more beer in Dutch John and were "partying" with some newly 
made female acquaintances. The group was traveling by a "back 
road" to Wyoming to get more beer when the accident occurred. 
Mr. Olsen and Mr. Shoup admitted they were not 
within the scope of their employment when the accident 
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occurred. In addition, both Mr. Shoup and Mr. Olsen 
admitted that they knew they did not have permission to use the 
vehicle when they left Manila and were traveling to Dutch John. 
The trial court concluded that Mr. Olsen was a 
named insured under the policy. The named insureds are listed 
on Item 1 of the Declarations of the policy. Item 1 of the 
Declarations listed J.R. Broadbent and the J.R. Broadbent 
Ranch. It did not mention employees, officers, or directors. 
The policy states that the named insureds and those defined as 
"you" are insured when using any covered auto. 
The term "you" is defined by the policy as the person 
or organization listed in Item 1. The vehicle Mr. Olsen was 
using was listed as a covered auto. If Mr. J.R. Broadbent was 
using that vehicle he would be insured at all times. Benny 
Olsen was not specifically listed as a named insured. 
Therefore, he can only be insured as a representative of the 
J.R. Broadbent Ranch. He only represented the Ranch when he 
was acting within the scope and course of his employment. 
The policy does not state that Mr. Olsen was 
covered when acting within the scope and course of his 
employment. However, when he was acting in this capacity, his 
employer, J.R. Broadbent Ranch, was responsible for his 
actions. Therefore since his employer was responsible and 
faces a risk of paying damages, as the named insured there 
should be coverage for it and Benny Olsen under the policy. 
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The J.R. Broadbent Ranch is an organization and not 
an individual. It cannot operate a vehicle. However, its 
owner has the right to expect coverage for it as a named 
insured on the automobile insurance policy when it faces 
vicarious liability for a vehicular accident. The ranch can 
only be held liable for automobile accidents that occur when 
its employees are acting within the scope and course of their 
employment. To meet this expectation coverage should be 
extended to provide protection to employees within the scope of 
their employment. To extend coverage further than this does 
not fit either the specific terms of the policy, nor the 
reasonable expectations of its owner. 
The trial court ruled that all Broadbent employees 
were covered at all times when they were using a listed 
vehicle. This is not stated in the policy. If the policy had 
intended coverage for all employees at all times they could 
have been individually listed as named insureds. J.R. 
Broadbent also could have requested and paid for coverage for 
groups such as "ranch managers" or "ranch hands." If so 
USF&G would be able to assess this expanded risk and charge 
an extra premium to cover all employees at all times. This 
coverage would then extend to all the employees whether they 
had stolen a listed vehicle, were using a listed vehicle 
without permission, or in this case had taken a listed vehicle 
for a party in a different state. 
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The cases in Utah and other jurisdictions that relate 
to employees' insurance coverage all deal with the omnibus or 
permissive user clause. This issue is discussed in Points II 
and III below. In all such cases the courts have ruled that 
the key issue is whether the employees, when beyond the scope 
and course of their employment, had permission to use the 
vehicle, and if so, how they deviated from such permission. 
None of these cases held that employees are covered at all 
times when they go beyond the scope and course of their 
employment. To write in such coverage in this situation is to 
create a fiction which is beyond the terms of the policy and 
the intentions of the parties and will impact every commercial 
automobile policy on the insurance market. 
POINT II 
BENNY OLSEN WAS TOLD AND SPECIFICALLY UNDERSTOOD 
HE DID NOT HAVE EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
PERMISSION TO USE THE BROADBENT VEHICLE. 
Benny Olsen had been assigned the use of a 
specific Broadbent company vehicle. He and the other 
employees had access to company gasoline tanks. Employees were 
allowed to use the vehicles to come and go from work. In 
addition, they were allowed to run errands to the nearby town 
of Manila or on infrequent occasions to travel to Wyoming to 
purchase supplies. Although there was nothing in writing, 
ranch foreman Paul Franklin stated that he specifically 
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instructed the workers not to use the vehicles for personal 
errands. 
Benny Olsen admitted that he had been told not to 
use the vehicle for personal functions. Mr. Olsen violated 
these instructions and started to use the vehicle after work 
for personal errands. Mr. Franklin discovered this and 
reprimanded him. Benny Olsen however continued to store 
his personal gear in the vehicle and to borrow it for local 
errands. There is no evidence that he ever used it for 
excursions beyond the Manila area. 
The Utah Supreme Court has reviewed insurance 
coverage situations where a user violated express instructions 
not to use a vehicle. In Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co./ 484 P.2d 1180 (Utah 1971); the facts 
were that James Allen let his 16-year-old brother-in-law use 
his jeep with specific instructions that the jeep was to be 
used only to go to and from his job at a livestock show. The 
brother-in-law was specifically told not to "run around" in the 
jeep. The 16-year-old violated these orders and used the 
vehicle to go to a dance. An accident occurred while he was 
coming home from the dance. The plaintiff, who was injured in 
the accident, attempted to argue in a subsequent declaratory 
judgment action that there was insurance coverage for the 
brother-in-law under the theory that once an individual is 
given permission to use a vehicle that coverage extends to all 
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uses, whether contemplated by the owner or not. The trial 
court granted the insurer summary judgment, and entered a 
finding that there was no coverage. On appeal the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed. The Supreme Court noted that the 16-year-old 
had specific knowledge that he could not use the vehicle for 
other than work purposes. Therefore the court held that once 
the 16-year-old knowingly violated these instructions, he did 
not have permission to use the vehicle and thus there was no 
coverage. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed this holding one year 
later in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Strang, 
496 P.2d 707 (Utah 1972). In Strang a State Farm insured 
was involved in an accident involving an uninsured automobile 
owned by a Mrs. Hamberlin. Mrs. Hamberlin had specifically 
forbidden her 15-year-old daughter Debra to drive the 
vehicle. However she left her keys in the drain board so her 
son could move some belongings into the garage. Debra took 
the keys and went for a joy ride with her friend Wendy. 
Debra gave Wendy, a State Farm insured, permission to drive 
the car and an accident occurred. State Farm filed a 
declaratory judgment action. The trial court granted it 
summary judgment, and entered a finding that there was no 
coverage. On appeal the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. The 
Supreme Court stated that since Debra had been specifically 
forbidden to use the automobile, and was therefore not in 
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lawful possession of it, she could not have give permission to 
her friend Wendy. Thus Wendy was not a permissive user and 
there was no coverage under the State Farm policy. 
In the case at hand Benny 01sen was allowed to 
use the J.R. Broadbent vehicle for work purposes. Mr. Olsen 
admitted that he knew he did not have permission to use the 
vehicle for personal errands. He had been reprimanded for 
doing so on a prior occasion. He admitted that he knew this 
was a violation of company policies. This violation and 
resulting accident on May 31, 1986, caused his firing. 
Paul Franklin stated that he told Benny Olsen not 
to use the vehicle for personal errands. He was emphatic in 
stating that Benny Olsen knew this restriction. In 
addition Jim Shoup, a fellow employee stated that he knew on 
May 31, 1986, that he and Benny Olsen did not have 
permission to take the vehicle to Dutch John. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the standard that 
one does not have insurance coverage when using a vehicle 
contrary to its owner's instructions. The court has stated 
that when one knowingly violates a specific instruction not to 
use a vehicle, that there should be no coverage. 
Benny Olsen admitted that he knowingly violated 
such specific instructions. The owner of the vehicle agreed 
with him. Therefore since they both agreed that Benny 
Olsen violated specific instructions limiting Mr. Olsen!s 
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use of the vehicle, there should be no insurance coverage for 
his actions under the Broadbent policy. 
POINT III 
IF BENNY OLSEN HAD IMPLIED PERMISSION TO USE 
THE BROADBENT VEHICLE IT WAS NEGATED BY HIS 
GROSS DEVIATION FROM ANY SUCH 
IMPLIED PERMISSION. 
The trial court was presented with the theory that 
Benny Olsen was an implied permissive user. The court 
found that Mr. Olsen had openly and notoriously used the 
vehicle on several occasions. The court found that these uses 
were known by Mr. Franklin, the ranch foreman. The court then 
concluded that since Mr. Franklin knew that Benny Olsen had 
repeatedly used the vehicle for personal errands that he had 
given him implied permission for unlimited use of the vehicle. 
Mr Olsen stored a motorcycle and fishing rod in the 
vehicle. He also used a lot of gas. However there is no 
evidence that Benny Olsen stayed out nights with the 
vehicle or that he took it to Dutch John for drinking parties. 
Mr. Olsen's activities in doing so on May 31, 1986, were a 
gross deviation from his prior open and notorious activities. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never dealt with whether a 
gross deviation from an implied permissive use negates 
insurance coverage. Other jurisdictions that have done so have 
developed four rules. These rules are as follows: 
1. The strict construction rule; 
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2. The liberal or "hell or high water" rule; 
3. The minor deviation rule; and 
4. The gross deviation rule. 
The "hell or high water" rule states that once an 
individual is given the general use of the vehicle, he is 
permitted to use it in any fashion, and coverage will be found 
in every situation. This theory is the opposite of the above 
Utah Supreme Court holdings which limit one strictly to the 
permission that is given. The broad "hell or high water" 
position does not look at the intent of the parties, but merely 
looks to see if some kind of implied or express permission has 
been given to an employee, and if so, insurance coverage is 
always found. This theory was reviewed by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. 
Smith, 279 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1960). 
The majority of courts have taken the middle-ground 
position and have adopted the minor deviation rule, or its 
counterpart, the newly developed gross deviation rule. The 
Tenth Circuit outlined the minor deviation rule in Fisher v. 
Firemans Fund Indemnity Co., 244 F.2d 194 (10th Cir. 
1957). In Fisher, Eve Rumpf was given permission from his 
employer to take one of its insured trucks to his residence and 
then to his parents1 house on Christmas day. Mr. Rumpfs 
parents lived approximately 15 miles northwest of his 
residence. Mr. Rumpf took the vehicle on Christmas Eve and 
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traveled approximately 100 miles on a solely personal journey. 
The inevitable accident occurred. The employer's insurer 
brought a declaratory judgment action to determine if there was 
coverage. The trial court found no coverage. On appeal the 
Tenth Circuit reviewed the strict, liberal, and minor deviation 
rules. The court adopted the minor deviation rule and held 
under it that coverage was afforded up to the point where there 
was a flagrant violation of the "permissive use" of the 
vehicle. The court then noted that since Mr. Rumpf had greatly 
deviated in time, purpose, direction, and distance from the 
allowed permissive use that it was doubtful that his use of the 
vehicle was within the contemplation of the named insured. The 
Tenth Circuit thus found there was no coverage. 
The analogous gross deviation rule was first 
discussed in Ryan v. Western Pacific Ins. Co., 408 P.2d 84 
(Ore. 1965). In Ryan, a Mr. Sinovick obtained permission 
from Tum-A-Lum his employer to use one of its listed vehicles 
to move some furniture. He was told he could return the 
vehicle after he finished moving. Mr. Sinovick finished 
moving, but then went to a show, a club, and eventually had an 
accident at 1:45 a.m. The injured party brought suit against 
Tum-A-Lum's insurer to determine if there was coverage. The 
trial court adopted the liberal view and found coverage. On 
appeal the Oregon Supreme Court discussed all four theories. 
Before doing so the court noted that since the named insured 
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was the employer and Sinovick was not specifically added as a 
named insured, that once he was beyond the scope and course of 
his employment, he was not a named insured. When looking at 
the three existing theories, the Oregon court stated it was 
"loathe" to adopt any of them. The court first rejected the 
liberal view because it did not conform to the risks that were 
sought by the insured or given by the insurer. The court 
rejected the strict view because it did not provide enough 
protection to those injured by careless drivers. It rejected 
the minor deviation rule as too restrictive. The Oregon court 
instead developed the gross deviation rule. It described this 
rule as providing coverage if the actual use did not represent 
a gross deviation from the permission given. In determining 
this the court looked at three factors; the purpose, time, and 
place of the actual use. The court found that if the driving 
was not so related to the original permission that there should 
be no coverage. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously adopted the 
strict construction rule. As argued in Point II, this rule is 
that if there is any deviation from the permission given that 
there is no coverage. In this situation that appears to be the 
case. 
However if this court is to reject that position, the 
next most attractive theory is that of the minor or gross 
deviation rule. When applying this rule the trial court should 
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review the purpose, time, and place of the actual use to 
determine if it falls within the expectations of the permittee 
and permittor. 
Benny Olsen was permitted to use the vehicle for 
company business and local authorized personal errands. In 
addition it became his pattern to use the vehicle to travel to 
the town, ride his motorcycle, or go fishing. All of these 
activities were done in and around the rural, unpopulated 
Manila area. At most it can be said that Mr. Olsen was given 
implied permission to use the vehicle around Manila. 
The accident in question occurred when Benny 
Olsen went on a drinking spree in Dutch John, Utah. 
Mr. Olsen traveled 3 0 to 40 miles to Dutch John and became 
intoxicated. He then picked up two women and was on his way to 
Wyoming for more beer when the accident occurred. This was not 
a slight, but instead was a gross deviation from any express or 
implied permission. 
The J.R. Broadbent Company, Benny Olsen's 
employer and the insured, did not want him to use the vehicle 
for other than work purposes. However, the court found that he 
had implied permission to use it for open and notorious 
personal errands. In doing so, the court imposed on the 
employer an intent to permit Benny Olsen to use its vehicle 
for personal errands around Manila, Utah. This intent should 
not be extended to allowing Mr. Olsen to travel to Dutch John 
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or Wyoming on drinking sprees. This limitation is shown by the 
fact that Benny Olsen was fired the day after the 
accident. 
Benny Olsen was using the vehicle after hours, 
and was not headed back to the ranch when the accident 
occurred. In addition he was a great distance away from the 
ranch and traveling away from it. Thus when applying the three 
factors: purpose, time, and place, it is clear that his actions 
constituted a gross and not minor deviation from the permission 
given. 
If this court adopts the implied permission standard, 
it should then also adopt the minor or gross deviation 
rule. In applying this rule to this situation, it is clear 
that Mr. Olsen grossly deviated from any implied permission. 
The trial court entered a finding of fact that Mr. Olsen was 
an implied permissive user. It was argued unsuccessfully that 
the court should then adopt the gross or minor deviation rule. 
The court instead adopted the "hell or high water" rule and 
said that once Mr. Olsen had permission, he could do as he 
pleased. This is a minority position and one that Utah should 
not adopt. 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court decision. First, Benny Olsen was 
not listed as a named insured. He was an employee, but 
employees were not listed on the policy. He was not acting 
within the scope of his employment as an employee when the 
accident occurred. Thus he was not a named insured under the 
policy. 
Mr. Olsen was given specific instructions not to 
use the vehicle. Utah law does not allow for deviations from 
such express restrictions. Therefore there is no coverage. 
Finally if coverage is allowed under an implied 
permissive use theory, there is no coverage for Mr. Olsen1s 
actions that were a gross deviation from those that were 
intended. Thus the trial court decision should be reversed and 
this Court should enter a ruling finding there is no coverage 
for Benny Olsen's actions or in the alternative should 
remit this matter for specific findings by the trial court in 
regard to Benny Olsen!s prior uses and his deviation 
therefrom. 
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DATED t h i s 10- day o f Mo"~4xs 1989. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST 
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, #1722 
Attorney for Kathy Brooks 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BENNY OLSEN, KATHY BROOKS, 
and MELISSA ALBEE, 
Defendants. 
KATHY BROOKS, 
Third Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J. R. BROADBENT, dba J.R. 
BROADBENT LIVESTOCK, 
Third Party 
Defendant. 
This matter having come before the Court for trial on 
Plaintiff's Complaint seeking declaratory judgment that 
Plaintiff, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company, 
was not liable to pay under a policy of insurance and this matter 
having come before the Court for trial on the 6th day of April, 
1989, and Robert G. Gilchrist having appeared as counsel for 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C86-8706 
Plaintiff; and Defendant, Kathy Brooks, was present and 
represented by Richard B. Johnson; Melissa Albee was present and 
represented by counsel, Thomas R. Patton. The Defendant Benny 
Olsen was not present but notice had been sent to Mr. Olsen and 
several attempts to subpoena Mr. Olsen to testify were made. 
J.R. Broadbent, dba J.R. Broadbent Livestock was not present 
having previously been dismissed by the Court pursuant to Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
This Court having heard the evidence presented by counsel 
and argument of the law relating to the issues and being fully 
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The only issue to be decided by the Court is whether 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company is liable 
for coverage of the accident pursuant to the policy of insurance 
sold to J.R. Broadbent, dba J.R. Broadbent Livestock. 
2. The Court finds, not exclusively, the following: 
(a) Benny Olsen used the vehicle belonging to J.R. 
Broadbent for personal use including shopping in Rock 
Springs, Wyoming on a number of occasions and also 
used the vehicle for personal use closer to the ranch; 
(b) On frequent occasions, the personal use was open 
and notorious and was evidenced by personal equipment 
2 
carried in the truck which is used for recreation 
including a motorcycle helmet, fishing equipment and 
guns ; 
(c) The frequent unauthorized use of the company 
vehicle was well known by Benny Olsen's grandfather, 
Paul Franklin; 
(d) In spite of Benny Olsen's unauthorized use of the 
J.R. Broadbent vehicle, nothing was done to restrict 
Mr. Olsen's use of the vehicle or to discipline him 
for the unauthorized use of the vehicle; 
(e) The unauthorized use was implied by the amount of 
gas used in Benny Olsen's truck which was obtained 
from the company gas tank; 
(f) The Court finds that pursuant to the words and 
phrases section of the policy subheading (a) that J.R. 
Broadbent coverage included the organization of J.R. 
Broadbent Livestock Company; 
(g) The Court specifically finds that Benny Olsen, by 
his employment, was a member and part of the 
organization absent an exclusion and, therefore, was 
an insured under the policy; 
(h) Benny Olsen had implied permission to use the 
J.R. Broadbent vehicle due to the numerous occasions 
3 
of unauthorized use of the company truck. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Within the terms and conditions of the policy issued to 
J.R. Broadbent, dba J.R. Broadbent Livestock Company, the named 
insureds include the J.R. Broadbent Company, J.R. Broadbent 
individual, J.R. Broadbent Land Company and Broadbent Livestock 
Company. 
2. That Benny Olsen was an employee of J.R. Broadbent and, 
at the time of the accident, was driving an insured vehicle of 
J.R. Broadbents and, consequently, is a named insured under the 
terms and conditions of the policy of insurance at issue. 
3. That the policy contained no exclusions that would limit 
or qualify Benny Olsen's use of the vehicle as a named insured. 
4. That Benny Olsen, as a named insured without any 
exclusion in the policy, is entitled to the coverage under the 
terms and conditions of the policy at issue at the time of the 
accident. 
5. That Benny Olsenfs open and notorious use of the J.R. 
Broadbent vehicle without any restrictions on his use or 
discipline establishes implied permission to use the vehicle and, 
consequently, is entitled to the insurance coverage provided. 
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6. The policy provides that a person is an insured who 
drives the vehicle with the permission of a named insured. The 
policy reads specifically "any one else is an insured while using 
with your permission a covered auto you own, hire, or borrow. . 
it 
7. Given that Benny Olsen had used the vehicle in the past 
for shopping in Rock Springs, Wyoming as well as using the 
vehicle on a number of occasions closer to the ranch, carried 
personal equipment used for recreation purposes including a 
helmet, fishing equipment and guns as well as the amount of gas 
used in the vehicle evidences the conclusion that Benny Olsen had 
implied permission to use the company vehicle for personal uses. 
8. The insurance coverage is present both because Benny 
Olsen qualifies as a named insured and also because there was 
implied permission to use the vehicle at the time of the 
accident. 
DATED this <&-* day of April, 1989. 
PAT B. BRIAN 
District Court Judge 
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2230 N. Univ. Parkway 
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Mr. Greg Sanders 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Benny 01sen 
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Manilla, Utah 84046 
Mr. Robert Gilchrist 
Attorney at Law 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, #1722 
Attorney for Kathy Brooks 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BENNY OLSEN, KATHY BROOKS, 
and MELISSA ALBEE, 
Defendants, 
KATHY BROOKS, 
Third Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J. R. BROADBENT, dba J.R. 
BROADBENT LIVESTOCK, 
Third Party 
Defendant. 
This matter having come before the Court for trial on 
Plaintiff's Complaint seeking declaratory judgment that 
Plaintiff, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company, 
was not liable to pay under a policy of insurance and this matter 
having come before the Court for trial on the 6th day of April, 
1989, and Robert G. Gilchrist having appeared as counsel for 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-8706 
Plaintiff; and Defendant, Kathy Brooks, was present and 
represented by Richard B. Johnson; Melissa Albee was present and 
represented by counsel, Thomas R. Patton. The Defendant Benny 
Olsen was not present but notice had been sent to Mr. Olsen and 
several attempts to subpoena Mr. Olsen to testify were made. 
J.R. Broadbent, dba J.R. Broadbent Livestock was not present 
having previously been dismissed by the Court pursuant to Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following: 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint for declaratory judgment absolving 
United States Fidelity and Guarantee Insurance Company from 
insurance coverage in the above-entitled case is denied. 
2. Insurance coverage by United States Fidelity Insurance 
Company is hereby ordered. 
3. The Court rules in favor of the Defendants and against 
the Plaintiff. 
DATED this ^ day of April, 1989. 
PATTB. BRIAN 
District Court Judge 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the //^^ day of D/I/ixl 
1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the 
following, postage prepaid. 
Mr. Thomas R. Patton 
2230 N. Univ. Parkway 
Cottontree Square, Suite 4-B 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Mr. Greg Sanders 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Benny 01sen 
J.R. Broadbent Ranch 
Manilla, Utah 84046 
Mr. Robert Gilchrist 
Attorney at Law 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
(j2tAA}J! /^fat/^f/ri)& 
3 
